Remove duplicates

[openssl-gost/engine.git] / gost_lcl.h

diff --git a/gost_lcl.h b/gost_lcl.h
index 4e1c4ea26cd16c69a3c5074156354842881350a9..bb18ff1122aa5bc10826012d62806db92a272c50 100644 (file)
--- a/gost_lcl.h
+++ b/gost_lcl.h
@@ -36,8 +36,7 @@ typedef struct R3410_ec {
 } R3410_ec_params;
 
 extern R3410_ec_params R3410_2001_paramset[],
-                      *R3410_2012_256_paramset,
-                       R3410_2012_512_paramset[];
+    *R3410_2012_256_paramset, R3410_2012_512_paramset[];
 
 extern const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN gost_cmds[];
 int gost_control_func(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void));
@@ -58,7 +57,9 @@ int register_pmeth_gost(int id, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth, int flags);
 /* For GOST 28147 MAC */
 # define key_ctrl_string "key"
 # define hexkey_ctrl_string "hexkey"
+# define maclen_ctrl_string "size"
 # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_MAC_HEXKEY (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL+3)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MAC_LEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL+5)
 /* Pmeth internal representation */
 struct gost_pmeth_data {
     int sign_param_nid;         /* Should be set whenever parameters are
@@ -69,10 +70,18 @@ struct gost_pmeth_data {
 };
 
 struct gost_mac_pmeth_data {
-    int key_set;
+    short int key_set;
+    short int mac_size;
+    int mac_param_nid;
     EVP_MD *md;
     unsigned char key[32];
 };
+
+struct gost_mac_key {
+    int mac_param_nid;
+    unsigned char key[32];
+    short int mac_size;
+};
 /* GOST-specific ASN1 structures */
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -142,14 +151,14 @@ typedef struct {
 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(MASKED_GOST_KEY)
 
 /*============== Message digest  and cipher related structures  ==========*/
-         /*
-          * Structure used as EVP_MD_CTX-md_data. It allows to avoid storing
-          * in the md-data pointers to dynamically allocated memory. I
-          * cannot invent better way to avoid memory leaks, because openssl
-          * insist on invoking Init on Final-ed digests, and there is no
-          * reliable way to find out whether pointer in the passed md_data is
-          * valid or not.
-          */
+    /*
+     * Structure used as EVP_MD_CTX-md_data. It allows to avoid storing
+     * in the md-data pointers to dynamically allocated memory. I
+     * cannot invent better way to avoid memory leaks, because openssl
+     * insist on invoking Init on Final-ed digests, and there is no
+     * reliable way to find out whether pointer in the passed md_data is
+     * valid or not.
+     */
 struct ossl_gost_digest_ctx {
     gost_hash_ctx dctx;
     gost_ctx cctx;
@@ -184,6 +193,7 @@ struct ossl_gost_imit_ctx {
     int key_meshing;
     int bytes_left;
     int key_set;
+    int dgst_size;
 };
 /* Table which maps parameter NID to S-blocks */
 extern struct gost_cipher_info gost_cipher_list[];
@@ -191,10 +201,12 @@ extern struct gost_cipher_info gost_cipher_list[];
 const struct gost_cipher_info *get_encryption_params(ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
 /* Implementation of GOST 28147-89 cipher in CFB and CNT modes */
 extern EVP_CIPHER cipher_gost;
+extern EVP_CIPHER cipher_gost_cbc;
 extern EVP_CIPHER cipher_gost_cpacnt;
 extern EVP_CIPHER cipher_gost_cpcnt_12;
 # define EVP_MD_CTRL_KEY_LEN (EVP_MD_CTRL_ALG_CTRL+3)
 # define EVP_MD_CTRL_SET_KEY (EVP_MD_CTRL_ALG_CTRL+4)
+# define EVP_MD_CTRL_MAC_LEN (EVP_MD_CTRL_ALG_CTRL+5)
 /* EVP_PKEY_METHOD key encryption callbacks */
 /* From gost_ec_keyx.c */
 int pkey_GOST_ECcp_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,